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ABSTRACT Blockchain is the next generation of secure data management that creates near-immutable
decentralized storage. Secure cryptography created a niche for blockchain to provide alternatives to
well-known security compromises. However, design bottlenecks with traditional blockchain data structures
scale poorly with increased network usage and are extremely computation-intensive. This made the technology difficult to combine with limited devices, like those in Internet of Things networks. In protocols like
IOTA, replacement of blockchain’s linked-list queue processing with a lightweight dynamic ledger showed
remarkable throughput performance increase. However, current stochastic algorithms for ledger construction
suffer distinct trade-offs between efficiency and security. This work proposed a machine-learning approach
with a multi-arm bandit that resolved these issues and was designed for auditing on limited devices. This
algorithm was tested in a reinforcement-learning environment simulating the IOTA ledger’s construction
with a decision tree. This study showed through regret analysis and experimentation that this approach was
secure against impulse manipulation attacks while remaining energy-efficient. Although the IOTA protocol
was a pioneer for lightweight distributed ledgers, it is expected that future blockchain protocols will adopt
techniques similar to those presented in this work.
INDEX TERMS Blockchain security, distributed ledger technology, Internet of Things, machine learning,
multi-arm bandit, regret analysis.

I. INTRODUCTION

Blockchain is one of the most revolutionary methods for
securing network data with adoption that has exploded into
a variety of data management communities, like government
documents [1] and financial products [2]. Recently, Internet
of Things (IoT) devices have received attention for data security in industries like supply-chain [3] and consumer households [4]. Data gathered from these devices efficiently tracks
inventory and products at distant third-party servers [5]. Limited hardware and mobility of many devices usually implies
reduced security [6]. Distributed IoT data lost to adversaries
can be used in social engineering or behavior prediction
attacks [7], creating a need for improved trust.
Blockchain is a potential solution with decentralized
data management. However, there are many challenges
to implementing blockchain on IoT due to traditional
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Peng-Yong Kong
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blockchain’s design decisions. The computationally-intense
queue processing of Sybil-prevention mechanisms like Proofof-Work (PoW) in Bitcoin [8] create bottlenecks for transaction throughput and network growth that directly conflicts
with the features of IoT. Recent works offloaded computation with machine-learning [9], [10] but compromise
decentralization. Only efforts that alternate ledger storage
formats [11]–[13] and allow concurrency with lightweight
verification can be feasibly implemented on IoT devices.
Of these, the IOTA protocol [11] successfully found a balance
between security and performance for IoT.
An open problem in the IOTA-related literature is the
development of lightweight and secure transaction selection
algorithms for ledger construction [14]. The selection
schemes are required to approve two existing transactions in creation of a new transaction, which decides
what data persists as ground-truth and can be vulnerable to ledger-specific attacks. There are works that discuss
improvements to ledger construction by expanding on basic
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methods [11], [14]. For example, E-IOTA [15] randomly
variedseveral construction algorithms to improve transaction
selection. These approaches were randomized to prevent
adversarial gaming, but do not deliberately remove the distinct possibility that a transaction will go unconfirmed in the
ledger. Use of complex features in transaction selection to
prevent this issue, such as using a ledger or network state,
were absent in the literature.
This paper proposes a ledger construction algorithm with
a robust multi-arm bandit approach to resolve the issue of
unconfirmed transactions while remaining secure. The bandit observes consistent rewards from the ledger environment to successfully avoid impulse attacks from adversaries
and increase security. The approach also considered limited IoT devices in its design with an auditable decision
tree using Q-learning from environment context. Analysis
and simulations of the proposed work show superior performance for confirming late transactions compared to other
schemes. Based on the author’s understanding, this is the
first blockchain protocol to actively use machine-learning in
decision-making, which is an open opportunity in general
blockchain research [16], [17].
The contributions for this work include secure reinforcement learning (RL) analysis for lightweight ledger construction and a robust multi-arm bandit algorithm. Regret analysis
and simulation for performance and security guarantees were
also included. Section II providesgeneral background related
to blockchain and learning mechanisms. Section IV discussesthe methodology for analyzing the IOTA ledger and its
security model. Section V shows results for the algorithm’s
effectiveness and regret analysis.
II. BACKGROUND

Combining IoT with blockchain is crucial for data security,
but not feasible with traditional blockchain design. Concurrency with recent protocols’ execution presented opportunities for lightweight machine learning in optimization and
attack avoidance.
A. IoT SECURITY AND IOTA

Internet of Things (IoT) consists of numerous heterogeneous
devices communicating to improve either consumer qualityof-life or manufacturing efficiency. Trivial schemes of collecting IoT data include traditional database systems with
network-distant servers [18]. In these schemes, a user must
accept consequences of not controlling their own data [19].
An advancement towards securely recording data management activity arose with blockchain networks. The core idea
behind blockchain is creating a secure ledger, where transactions recorded describe network activity. The ledger is then
distributed in the network and shared equally between all ‘full
nodes’ participating and organized in block chunks. Blocks
are then linked together via cryptographic hashes, hence the
term ‘blockchain.’ Each node in a basic blockchain network
contains the entire history of the ledger, though offloading
VOLUME 10, 2022

can be introduced with reliance on full blockchain nodes for
limited devices [9].
An example of an IoT blockchain transaction is a digitally formatted agreement between a user and a third-party
to supply them data generated from a user’s devices, such
as temperature sensor readings from a device swarm. Since
the agreement has been made publicly available on the
blockchain network, users are given confidence that their data
is only being used by the agreed-upon third-party, improving
IoT trust and user privacy. Effectively employing limited IoT
hardware as a full node remains one of the blockchain’s
most prevalent challenges, as the two paradigms have several characteristics that directly conflict, including: network
scalability, computational demand, and large ledger storage.
The blockchain industry used to address these issues by
using alternative ledger structures. Recent protocols proposed generalized schemes that form a Directed Acyclic
Graph (DAG) instead of a single linked-list like in traditional
blockchain. These ledgers fundamentally differ but accomplish the same tasks as traditional blockchain, so they and
blockchain have been termed Distributed Ledger Technology
(DLT). A DAG ledger consists of interconnected single transactions that each reference one or more previous transactions.
This form factor was adopted by various DLT networks such
as Hadera Hashgraph [12], Nano [13], and Obyte [20]. One
pioneering DLT network offering protocol flexibility is IOTA.
This protocol is an IoT-focused scheme that emphasised
direct use on IoT devices with its ledger, called the Tangle.
The Tangle’s dynamic benefits in ledger construction and
data storage make it practical for use in IoT networks for
a variety of reasons. One of the key benefits of the Tangle
is the removal of strict ledger policies enforcing the same
view of the ledger like with traditional blockchain. Nodes
are allowed to have differing views of the ledger and are not
required to directly confirm the same transactions. For example, a mobile IoT device like a smart car with intermittent
network access is able to continue making transactions while
disconnected from the network and then broadcasts records
when reconnecting. This is the primary reason for the change
in ledger structure, as relying on a linked-list blockchain
would introduced bottlenecks in ledger growth. It is important
to understand how the IOTA protocol is groundbreaking for
allowing direct IoT device usage in DLT networks, as it
presents many research opportunities for securing distributed
IoT data. A simple example implementation of the IOTA
network is shown in Fig.1.
IOTA, at the time of writing, is experiencing a massive
research effort that removes a centralized coordinator for verifying transactions [14]. Though the new type of ledger shape
offers greater concurrency than a blockchain, it has additional
challenges in protocol efficiency and security.. As transactions are selected by individual nodes and appended to the
tip of the DAG, there are no enforced protocols for devices
to confirm a specifictransaction or group of transactions like
blockchain. An open area of research noted by the IOTA
foundation is effective transaction selection algorithms [14].
10839
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FIGURE 1. IOTA ledger construction overview.

The class of algorithms accomplishing this are simply called
tip selection algorithms, which are used for constructing the
DAG ledger by selecting transactions at the tip of the growing
graph. A general overview of the ledger protocol and how
a single new transaction is appended is shown in Fig. 1.
More discussion on the security of tip selection is provided
in Section IV.
B. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING

The general machine-learning methodology chosen to create
an intelligent tip selection algorithm was RLQ-learning [21].
In this scheme, a learner chose an action in the action space
A ∈ A to take for a given state in the state space S ∈ S
of a Markov Decision Process (MDP). Each A was associated with a reward value R from a value function V , called
Q-values. The optimal policy from these Q-values, Q∗ , is
usually approximated with a machine learner like a Multilayer Perceptron (MLP). Other lightweight algorithms like
policy gradient were considered [22], but since Q-learning
was simple and memory-efficient, it was chosen for an IoT
environment.
A design decision considered for directly applying
machine learning with blockchain was maintaining auditability. A variety of machine learning algorithms are powerful in
approximating unknown nonlinear functions, but are difficult
for average humans and researchers to understand. The key
strength of blockchain and DLT is that anyone can verify
the account balances in the ledger, providing strong security.
A Decision Tree (DT) from Conservative Q-improvement [23]
was chosen as the base learner for this scheme. This DT
creation decides how to grow the tree based on a perceived
increase in Q-values.
The Multi-arm Bandit (MAB) is a classic RL problem
for determining an optimal selection from a set of discrete
actions in the case of uncertain rewards. The contextual bandit
was an extension of the MAB that considers an environment
with different states of learning for S ∈ S [24]. The main
decision-making algorithms behind a MAB are called bandit algorithms. Bandits have been analyzed through regret
10840

analysis for their performances and security guarantees.
Regret is simply a value of measure used to record how the
ideal action differs from the action taken by the learner and is
denoted as |R1 − Ri |, where R1 is the reward for the optimal
action. It was noted in related works that several lightweight
bandits were gameable by adversaries, which was accomplished by poisoning rewards [25]. One effort showed that
bandits like -greedy and Upper Confidence Bound (UCB)
[24] (using random exploration and reduced-uncertainty of
the maximal arm, respectively), were gameable in O(log(n))
time [26]. One of the simplest robust bandit algorithms was
Thompson Sampling (TS) [27]. TS is the first bandit algorithm that successfully balanced exploration and exploitation
with use of the beta distribution for posterior distribution sampling. With a beta posterior distribution (denoted as Beta),
TS finds an optimal arm for I actions with shape parameters
Ai,0 = Bi,0 = 1: a = argmaxi∈I {Beta(Ai , Bi )}. As the learner
encounters changes in the environment through Bernoulli
rewards R ∈ [0, 1], the update for each shape parameter
associated with the chosen action j is
(
Ai , Bi
if j 6= i
αt , βt =
Ai + R, Bi + (1 − R) if j = i
The security of TS showed robustness to adversarial
attacks under arm manipulation [28], but [25] showed an
effective scheme to poison rewards with offline data. It is
important to understand the vulnerabilities of TS for creation
of a robust version in Section IV.
III. RELATED WORKS

Though blockchain is a very recent technology, it has experienced a plethora of works with applications to various sectors.
Recent developments with DLT networks like IOTA have also
received attention for the performance and security opportunities in related research.
A. MACHINE LEARNING FOR BLOCKCHAIN WITH IoT
DEVICES

Blockchain has been extensively used to improve privacy for
various technologies [1]–[3] even with only recent development. Research opportunities with blockchain and machine
learning have also been heavily explored [29]. While many
works focus on using deep learning with blockchain as a basis
for storing data [30] or cryptocurrency price predictions [31],
learning optimization with blockchain for IoT has also seen
many efforts in networking [9], [10], [32] and other applications [33]. However, from the surveyed literature, machine
learning has not been used as the active security measure in a
DLT protocol.
While there is much discussion about how blockchain
can improve the efficiency and security of artificial intelligence [16], cyber-physical systems [17], and IoT [34],
the opposite has not received as much attention. The primary reason for this is believed to be due to traditional
blockchain’s rigid data structure and execution, presenting
VOLUME 10, 2022
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very few improvements for machine learning besides improving efficiency with consensus calculations [35]. As newer
DLT protocols like IOTA present freedom in protocol execution, more opportunities emerge. This work is believed to
be the first discussion exploring the security of the underlying
blockchain protocol and improvements with machine learning for general blockchain technology, in addition to DLT
protocols designed for an IoT setting.
B. IOTA LEDGER CONSTRUCTION

Ledger construction, or tip selection, in the IOTA protocol has
seen several works exploring alterations to basic protocols,
though there is still believed to be room for novelty at the time
of writing. Original simplistic algorithms proposed in [11]
were proposed for basic functionality and security against
attacks. Additional work done by the IOTA foundation analyzed the performance of tip selection and the Tangle in
discrete [36] and continuous time [37]. Further work by the
IOTA foundation explored other methods of analyzing ledger
security [38]. As the IOTA foundation worked to remove the
centralized coordinator as a part of the Coordicide effort [14],
the authors proposed a lighter tip selection algorithm with
reliance on an external voting system [39].
Approaches by other parties were conducted to identify
novel ledger construction schemes. Wang, Jia, Wang, Shen,
Zhao, Chen, and Shao [40] explored increasing the efficiency of basic tip selection algorithms through heavy use
of concurrency for lightweight nodes. Other works use existing algorithms, similar to this work, as a base for selection
of multiple algorithms. E-IOTA [15], which expanded on
G-IOTA [41], explored stochastically varying selection of
several basic algorithms to improve transaction selection
while remaining secure. Ferraro, Shorten, and King [42]
explored used liquid modelling with IOTA’s ledger and proposed their own hybrid scheme for high transaction confirmation rates. Other approaches take more novel directions to
develop novel tip selection algorithms. Bramas [43] explores
a two-step algorithm for resolving conflict resolution for sets
of tips. Chafjiri and Mehdi Esnaashari Esfahani [44] used an
adaptive random walk to improve selection efficiency.
IV. METHODOLOGY

After a brief discussion of ledger construction and security,
a threat model for transaction selection is presented before
providing the secure algorithms. For construction of the IOTA
ledger, analysis of ideal behavior was necessary for reward
function design. Security concerns and known vulnerabilities
were then considered for robust decision-making. Finally,
a multi-arm bandit algorithm was proposed for protection
against reward attacks. This algorithm uses batch processing
with highlighted rewards and filtering to prevent adversary
impulse attacks from influencing learning.
A. LEDGER CONSTRUCTION AND SECURITY

The IOTA Tangle ledger is a DAG G = (V , E). Each v ∈ V
contains a transaction that represented an exchange of tokens
VOLUME 10, 2022

between multiple parties. Directed edge e ∈ E represent a
cryptographic link approving a previous transaction in the
ledger. The only requirement in the IOTA protocol for a
node approving a new transaction is confirming two previous
transactions [11]. In addition, as networking delays and disconnects occur, some nodes may create subgraphs of G with
differing v and e. For simplicity of analysis, these differences
were ignored to create only a single version of the ledger.
Any time a transaction is generated, the following steps are
performed:
1) A network node creates a new transaction x
2) Nodeconducts a selection algorithm k times, where k ≥
2 to confirm k previous transactions
3) Nodeconductsa verification scheme to generate k cryptographic links e ∈ E
4) Broadcast e with x to the network
5) Network verifies the integrity of the cryptographic link.
It was assumed the neighbor and node verifies data with PoW,
though any verification scheme could be used. At step 2,
the node has an opportunity to analyze the ledger state for
intelligent ledger construction.
The ledger state viewed from a single transaction x can be
viewed as a discrete Markov chain [45]. Between each state,
the total number of unconfirmed transactions L(t) can vary
along with the accumulated weight of an individual transaction W (x). L(t) can be modelled as a Poisson process [11]
with mean rate λ. W (x) is the accumulation of individual
weights of all future transactions approving x, where each
weight is proportional to the amount of work done to verify
those transactions. It was assumed W0 = 1 and all future
weights are also 1 for this study.
The value |L(t)| depends highly on the tip selection algorithm chosen to construct the ledger [11]. The simplest tip
selection algorithm is called Uniform Random Tip Selection
(URTS), which randomly selected transactions with probability 1/|L(t)|. Each transaction has a probability > 0 of being
selected, so URTS is guaranteed to not leave transactions
behind [11]. The stable value for URTS is [11]
kλh
,
(1)
k −1
where h is the time taken to confirm a transaction (it is
assumed h = 1). Generally nodes choose k = 2, L(t) ≈
2λ = LIdeal . If L(t) < LIdeal (due to k > 2), then nodes will
waste resources confirming past transactions. However, one
issue with URTS is that it can be easily gamed into selecting
transactions approving an attack on the ledger. If an attack
created some conflict in the ledger, an adversary can create
numerous empty transactions approving their attack. When a
node confirmed one of these dummy transactions, it helps
the attacker (see Fig. 2).
With these known vulnerabilities, Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) was developed [11]. With MCMC,
a weighted random walk was used to select a new transaction at the ledger edge. MCMC started from transaction in
a window [W , 2W ], and a random walk was taken from a
L(t) =
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alter the distribution of tips at the side or front edge of the
DAG [37].
With these considerations, a reward function for ledger
construction was created. The reward function with R ∈ [0, 1]
is
R = 0.9σtip − 0.05(k − 2)
k/σtip

− LB

+ BMCMC + BURTS ,

(3)

where LB is the number of transactions left behind,
LB =

FIGURE 2. Parasite chain attack example.

|{x ∈ L(t) | xt,Ledger < (µtip − 3 ∗ σtip )}| − |M |
,
|L(t)|

while BMCMC and BURTS are
transaction towards the unconfirmed tip edge. The parameter
α biases selection towards transactions with higher weight
accumulated from future transaction selection (see Fig. 2).
α > 0 prevents selection of transactions that would help
this type of attack be successful, called a parasite chain
attack. The probability of a random walker transitioning from
transaction x to y when y approves x is found by[11]
Pxy =

exp(αWy )
6z:z x exp(αWz )

(2)

where Wz is the cumulative weight of the transaction z and
the sum is taken over all transactions z which approve x.
High bias will not likely explore the Tangle for legal transactions that have less weight compared to the frequentlyselected, meaning they will be selected with probability ≈0.
As the majority of the network will produce higher weights
with legal transactions, it will outpace the attacker. This also
applies to other attacks that target cumulative weight, like
ledger splitting [11].
Information was presented to a machine learner to find
S ∈ S. The goal of the learner is to avoid attacks while
simultaneously confirming late transactions. The distribution
of unapproved transactions with times falling behind the
current timestamp of the next arriving transaction was represented as a distribution. Though the transactions arrive from
the Poisson process with an exponential interval time, the
state of current and past transaction events without approval
was represented with the normal distribution mean µtip and
standard deviation σtip . The following was used to represent
S as a vector,
• Perceived network transaction rate λobv
• The difference LErr = |LIdeal − L(t)|
• Average tip time µtip
• Tip time standard deviation σtip
The actions chosen for the learner consisted of standard tip
selection algorithms. These actions were:
• URTS with k = 2
• URTS with k = 3
• MCMC with α = 0.1, k = 2
• MCMC with α = 0.9, k = 2
A learner conducting either URTS or MCMC creates either
exploratory or secure actions. Altering α allows a learner to
10842

BMCMC = 0.1αMCMC ∗ 1{MCMC}
BURTS = 0.01 ∗ LB ∗ 1{URTS}.
The set M containsmalicious transactions associated with any
previous attack. Behavior letting transactions fall behind was
inhibited while incentivizing secure actions. This was done
using the two binary (hence Bx ) terms in the later part of
the reward function, where each binary term is only evaluated when the respective x algorithm is selected. If URTS is
selected, the learner is given incentive to continue selecting
URTS if |LB | > 0. When |LB | = 0, no reward is gained
from URTS and the only reward can be earned from selecting
MCMC with high α. The constant 0.9 in (3) presents a
baseline reward that was chosen arbitrarily, though it needs
to be less than 1 to give reward for MCMC actions.
Other flat reward values for individual actions
(0.1, 0.05, 0.01) were chosen so the largest constant value was
rewarded to the action with the desired behavior (MCMC),
though individual values were also chosen arbitrarily. Actions
with k > 2 were also discouraged from selection to only
when necessary in the second term, but encouraged in the
third term by decreasing the negative reward for |LB | > 0.
xt,Ledger = t − tCreation denotes the difference in time that a
node creates or receives a transaction from the current time.
With most terms in (3), an adversary would not be able
influence the reward. However, if unconfirmed transactions
were spammed, LB would increaseand createa drastic drop in
reward. This was addressed with an algorithm that is robust
to dramatic reward changes.
B. THREAT MODEL

Although one of the main benefits of using a DAG is the
increased throughput, the downside is the additional vulnerabilities. The overall goal of an attacker is to create an
attack transaction and convince the network it is correct.
This is well-known in blockchain literature as a double-spend
attack [46]. This attack can be accomplished through various methods with their own attack name, such as the
51% attack [46]. The exact percentage of network computing power a successful attack needs varies depending on
blockchain consensus mechanisms and strategies [47]. This
study considered either the brute-force strategy, where the
VOLUME 10, 2022
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that the weight of individual transactions is not considered in
the algorithm.

FIGURE 3. Intelligent ledger construction general threat model.

Algorithm 1 General Ledger Construction Algorithm
1: Initialize Tangle, L(t), M , C, i ∈ I arms
2: S0 ∈ S : Ai = Bi = 0
3: ∀S ∈ S : tS = 0
4: while receive x ∈ L(t) do
5:
Sobv = {λobv , LErr , µtip , σtip }
6:
Find Sobv ≈ S ∈ S with DT
7:
j, R = BiasedTS(S)
8:
Execute Aj ∈ A and create k cryptographic edges
9:
Broadcast x with k links
10:
Update DT according to [23] with R
11:
if SplitNode(S) then
12:
SLeft , SRight inherit Ai , Bi , Hi from S

attacker can only leverage blank transactions for the attack,
or other ledger-specific attacks and was in the network minority. It was assumed the attacker does not control information
sent to an IoT node in an Eclipse or Sybil-related attack [48].
The attacker also had perfect knowledge of the ledger learner
and all internal parameters, because it was white-box. An
overview of this is shown in Fig. 3.
The additional vulnerabilities from adding RL were also
addressed. An attacker will try to game the decision-making
process of an innocent node to help in their attack strategy
through several means, such as [49]: evasion, poisoning, and
exploratory. It was assumed that an adversary could alter
the inputs to influence the reward during testing, meaning
robustness against attacks was needed. Exploratory attacks
were not beneficial to the attacker, since the learner was
already white-box.

Algorithm 2 BiasedTS(S)
1: Get {tS , Ai , Bi , Hi , fi } ∈ S
2: j = argmaxi∈I {Beta(Ai , Bi )}
3: fj + = 1
4: R = Reward for Aj ∈ A from (3)
5: Hj .append(R)
6: FilteredMean(Hj )
7: if tS ≥ C then
8:
for i ∈ I do
9:
l = |Hi | − 1
10:
J = max(1, fi ∗ E(Hi [l − fi : l]))
11:
K = max(1, fi ∗ (1 − E(Hi [l − fi : l])))
12:
U = Beta(J , K )
13:
Ai = Ai + U
14:
Bi = Bi + (1 − U )
15: tS = 0
16: fi = 0
17: return j, R

Algorithm 3 FilteredMean(Hj )
1: l = |Hj | − 1
2: if |Hj | < C then
3:
Return Hj [l]

12:
13:
14:
15:

X = {sgn(Hj [l − C + 1] − Hj [l − C]), . . . ,
sgn(Hj [l] − Hj [l − 1])}
Y = {|Hj [l − C + 1] − Hj [l − C]|, . . . , |Hj [l] − Hj [l − 1]|}
W =[]
1Rµ = E(Y )
1Rσ = σ (Y )
for y in 1 : |Y |do
W .append(Y [y] > 1Rµ + 3 ∗ 1Rσ )
for w in 1 : |W |do
if W [w] then
Add transactions causing attack W [w] to M
for z in w : C − 1 do
Hj [l −C +z+1] = Hj [l −C +z]−X [z]∗Y [z]

16:

Return E(Hj )

4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

C. INTELLIGENT TRANSACTION SELECTION

The general approach for intelligent machine-learning ledger
construction is shown in Algorithm 1. The core intelligence
behind this approach is an extension to Bernoulli TS with an
approach that emphasizes learning from consistent reward
increases in Algorithm 2, called Biased TS. The comes from
the adjusted shape values for each arm created by frequency
of arm pulls. If an adversary poisons several reward values
for an non-optimal arm, the few impulses will eventually be
forgotten by another arm that creates a more consistent average from the innocent network majority for the Beta update
in [0, 1]. The inspiration for this approach came from batch
processing with TS [50] and posterior sampling [51]. Note
VOLUME 10, 2022

Given the literature discussing the adversarial security of
TS [25], [52], it was assumed that Biased TS was still vulnerable to manipulation with large reward values. A simple
prevention scheme against reward poisoning attacks is presented in Algorithm 3. This was done with a light form of
filtering shown in Algorithm 3. If an adversary were to create
a parasite chain that drastically changed |L(t)|, it would not
influence the behavior of the learner. This approach does not
completely prevent selection of parasite chain transactions,
but it does prevent adversarial gaming. While [53] originally
presented the idea of a trimmed mean to a UCB MAB,
this approach directly removes the adversary influence by
10843
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filtering out large adversarial attacks that would otherwise
influence an arm’s mean reward. Notice the careful indexing
in Algorithm 3, where actions selected for the current batch
are also compared to the previous experience if f < C. Legal
actors can avoid transactions being added to M by slowly
publishing their transactions tothe network, or the node with
intelligent selection can slowly adjust to the live network.
Stepping through the algorithms collectively, the IOTA
node with intelligent transaction selection is initialized with
the DT from [23]. Biased TS shape parameters are initially
Ai = Bi = 0 for the first tree node S0 and are inherited by
child nodes as the tree is generated and split. The current
network state Sobv and processed through the DT before it
is passed to Biased TS. The action arm index j is chosen
like the standard Bernoulli TS, where the number of arm
pulls fj are recorded during a batch count C. The history
of rewards Hj is then used in Algorithm 3 to detect if the
change in reward for the new sample is anomalous compared
to a normal distribution of the previous C reward samples.
When C actions have been taken between all arms, the beta
distributions are updated for Biased TS using the previous fi
samples. Using an intermediary Beta distribution to update
arm samples slows the learning capabilities of standard TS,
but allows for identification of consistent reward updates.
Consistently positive rewards will create higher values for the
intermediary Beta over time and update the shape parameters
with greater rewards than other arms.
V. RESULTS

To demonstrate the methodology in Algorithm 1-3 and from
other approaches in the literature, the IOTA ledger simulator1
was used. A RL environment for the Tangle was created in
OpenAI gym in Python [54]. All simulations are provided in
the repository.2
A. COMPARISON OF ALGORITHMS

The tip selection algorithm with Biased TS was compared to
two other complex approaches. The current algorithm used
by the IOTA foundation is called almostURTS [14]. The
almostURTS algorithm is an extension of URTS with an
added weight bias towards transactions that were confirmed
with recent timestamps. To simulate network delays, noise
was added to a transactions received timestamp. Without
this noise, almostURTS behaved like regular URTS. The
other algorithm selected was ‘E-IOTA’ [15]. E-IOTA varies
algorithm selection randomly with MCMC and varying levels
of α. The parameters for this algorithm were selected based
on the best parameters presented in [15]. Each approach was
then compared to pure selection of URTS and MCMC.
The training and DT parameters are shown in Table 1.
The value for λ = 10 was chosen in simulation to mimic
a similar value for the real IOTA network at the time of

TABLE 1. DT training and testing parameters.

writing.3 As the network rate can increase depending on node
participation, training values for λ were varied uniformly with
a bound of [5, 50]. No attacks were simulated, so line 13 in
Algorithm 3 was not executed. After eachtrail, tree nodes not
frequently visited were pruned. The bandit had difficulty balancing actions without prior reward experience, so learning
was frozen until tree nodes were generated. New nodes in the
tree inherited Ak , Bk upon splitting, and HS was reset to 1
each time a node was split. For optimization, the parameter
optimization framework Optuna [55] was used to explore
the parameter space for 1600 trials. The best parameters
minimizing URTS selection and tips left behind were then
chosen manually for the final results.
The performance of each algorithm was compared by looking at the amount of transactions left behind. These were
measured by counting timestamps more than three standard
deviations of tip time for the pure URTS selection from the
respective algorithm mean. The best-case (URTS) and worstcase (MCMC) scenarios for leaving transactions behind were
also performed (see Fig. 4).
With the low number of transactions left behind for DT
in Fig. 4, this shows that the approach was more effective
at taking actions to confirm late transactions compared to
other stochastic algorithms. The confirmation performance
was more comparable to almostURTS while accomplishing secure actions. Since similar performance is achievable with secure algorithms without relying on an external
voting mechanism [39], IoT devices in a distributed will
have stronger security and likely avoid ledger attacks more
compared to other approaches.

1 IOTA Ledger Simulator Repository.
2 Intelligent Ledger Construction Repository.
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3 IOTA Network Explorer.
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FIGURE 5. Control regret comparison (Bi = 0).
FIGURE 4. Average transactions left behind comparison.
TABLE 2. Average algorithm computation comparison (10 trials).

The number of computations for each basic algorithm were
also compared in Table 2. For all algorithms besides the
DT approach, the total number of tip selection executions
conducted was 1998 for 1000 transactions (two for each transaction minus two for the starting transaction). Comparing
the DT approach to the other selection schemes like E-IOTA
with MCMC with α = 0, intelligent selection was able to
execute insecure actions (with URTS) fewer times for ledger
construction to confirm late transactions. Other results from
the parameter study were able to further reduce left behind
tips, but executed insecure actions slightly more compared to
the results in in Table 2. The low amount of URTS actions
was achievable for the DT with a relatively high learning
rate and reward bias. The slow learning of Biased TS helped
child nodes in the DT improve from experience, with the
drawback of long training time. Using a ‘static’ configuration
for varying actions like E-IOTA showed that more transactions were being left behind according to the metrics used in
testing.
B. REGRET ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION

An extension was provided to existing work [52] for regret
with Bernoulli TS to estimate the upper bound for expected
regret in Biased TS . Calculating the upper bound for regret
in a control scenario provides a mathematical metric for
comparing the worst-case performance of multiple MAB
algorithms. Theorem 1 shows how Biased TS can be expected
to behave under normal operating conditions.
Theorem 1: Let each arm i = 1, . . . , I and constant batch
number C. The expected amount of regret for Biased TS in
Algorithm 2 is
E[R(T )] ≤

I
X
4 lnT
i
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C

1i +

48
.
µi 1i2

An approach similar to [28] was used to find expected
regret of Biased TS under an adversarial setting. This analysis
assumed that the adversary had a strategy of manipulating an
arm with total budget Bi . According to (4) in [28], the upper
bound for expected regret in TS is dependant on Bi . In the context of blockchain, this factor is crucial as an adversary with a
large budget (of computation power to generate transactions)
would be able to easily manipulate normal TS by spamming
transactions. A tighter regret bound for Biased TS was proven
without reliance on Bi and instead shows that the worst-case
performance is dependant on smaller changes in reward that
are able to shift the perceived distribution of an arm.
Theorem 2: Let each arm i = 1, . . . , k and constant batch
number C. The expected amount of regret for Biased TS under
an adversarial setting with arm budget Bi is
E[R(T )] ≤

I
X
4 lnT
i

C

1i + max{

H
, H σ logT },
2

where H = |3σ1R +µ1R | for the reward change distribution.
The full proof of Theorem 1 and 2 with full term definitions
is provided in the Appendix. Compared to the upper regret
bounds for Gaussian TS in [28], Biased TS has worse regret
in the control case from Theorem 1 due to the large constant
in the second term. For the adversarial setting, a tighter regret
bound with the logarithmic regret was proven compared to
the natural logarithm for Gaussian TS.
Other bandit algorithms, -greedy and Gaussian TS, were
compared against for their robustness to arm manipulation.
The adversary had a total budget for manipulating each individual arm Bi and individual trial manipulation values αt,i to
increase a reward. Each algorithm was tested with and without the Lump Sum Investment (LSI) attack strategy outlined
in [28], where the attacker spends the rest of its remaining
budget on attacking an arm to convince the bandit it had
τ α . Fig. 5
higher rewards at times τ : Ri = Ri + Bi − 6t=1
t,i
and Fig. 6 compare each algorithm’s standard and adversarial
regret respectively. The regret for each trial |R1 −Ri | was plotted and averaged over 10 trials. The simulation parameters for
regret are shown in Table 1.
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FIGURE 6. Adversarial regret comparison (Bi = 30).
TABLE 3. Average computation experiment comparison (50 trials).
FIGURE 7. Tip selection energy comparison.

Biased TS shows noticeably worse regret under control
conditions compared to Gaussian TS and UCB . The UCB
algorithm was able to obtain the optimal action quickly with
little increase in regret, while the Gaussian TS took longer
on average. For a small attack budget in Fig. 6, Biased TS
maintained near-identical regret levels to the control case This
shows that Biased TS is a more secure algorithm for preventing arm manipulation compared to the other approaches for
strong impulse attacks, which would be caused by a spam of
transactions and a drop in reward for (3). Gaussian TS had
slightly worse regret for Bi = 30 and increased from higher
values in further testing. The UCB algorithm had drastically
worse regret for the small attack and continued to increase
with stronger attacks.
One note about the attack results in Fig. 6 is that the
LSI attack strategy outlined in [28] is not believed to be
the most effective strategy for Biased TS. Since rewards
for Biased TS are limited to [0, 1] while other approaches
have rewards in R, comparing the attack performance of the
standard MAB algorithms to Biased TS is not fair. Scaling the
reward proved difficult to obtain stable regret results from all
bandits simultaneously. More effective attacks against Biased
TS and comparison to other algorithms will be explored in
future work.
C. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS

For consideration of IoT devices, tip selection with Biased
TS was measured for its energy consumption and throughput
performance.
1) ENERGY CONSUMPTION

A Raspberry Pi 4 Model B with the Raspbian OS was running
Python 3.7 with code provided in the repository using a
standard 5V power supply. The Pi uses a 1.5 GHz CPU with
the Arm Cortex-A72 architecture. Each algorithm in Table 3
10846

was executed for 10 trials of creating 1000 transactions with
λ = 10. Each group of trials was repeated 5 times for a total
of 50 trials. The Pi was monitored with a MakerHawk USB
Power monitor and recorded on a separate computer. The
voltage and current were measured and averaged over each
trial group and recorded in Table 3. In addition, the Linux tool
perf stat was used to estimate the number of cycles and
instructions generated by each algorithm. The results showed
that the DT did not cause a drastic power draw or computation
compared to tested algorithms. Note the scale to 0.5 V in
Fig. 7, where the spikes created form the DT approach are
likely correlated to underlying operating systems execution
and not a concern for the tip selection energy draw.
2) THROUGHPUT PERFORMANCE

Each algorithm’s throughput to conduct transaction selection was also compared. Insight into how the approach with
Biased TS will perform can be shown by running isolated
ledger constructions algorithms. For this approach, the same
setup used to generate Fig. 8 for the energy analysis was
used with the Raspberry Pi and optimized decision tree to
run experiments recording the individual execution time of
tip algorithm selection for each type of ledger construction in
Fig. 8. Each algorithm was executed for a total of 50 trials
with the average recorded.
The optimized decision tree algorithm takes longer to
execute than other existing approaches due to execution of
the DT code, including pure MCMC. In response to this,
a separate DT limited to 10 nodes (but not optimized) was also
executed for comparison using the same setup. This limited
DT was able to execute similarly to pure MCMC. It may
be possible to further reduce the execution time of transaction selection by finding a more powerful greatly optimized
decision tree, though this performance is not expected to
decrease dramatically as the base tip selection algorithms still
need to be executed. It should be acknowledged that these
results could be better optimized for low-level hardware if
VOLUME 10, 2022
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security. Future work will explore this topic further with
efforts to improve analysis of rare attack transactions through
data augmentation techniques.
VI. CONCLUSION

FIGURE 8. Algorithm cumulative execution delay comparison.

executed in a lower-level programming language, or rewritten
for concurrency [40].
D. REFLECTION AND FUTURE WORK

Ledger construction with Biased TS showed improved performance with intelligent selection. Highlighting consistent
reward changes and filtering outliers successfully prevents
impulse attacks. Bounding filtered values by outliers in
the reward change distribution were key for logarithmic
regret bounds. One issue with the learning strength of DT
is it needed incentive to minimize selection of URTS by
adding BURTS and BMCMC to (3), thus increasing complexity. Another issue worth noting is that an adversary may
have more success with manipulation if they are able to
create consistent poisoned rewards, though only if they are
not network minority. Attacks against intelligent transaction
selection were not simulated (also without executing line 13
in Algorithm 3), so incorporating a more realistic live simulations may also alter results and could be explored by future
researchers. This study is still believed to be, at the time of
writing, the first to discuss active use of machine learning
in blockchain technology. Future researchers could explore
some of the issues presented with this work to expand the
discussion and strengthen the security of intelligent ledger
construction.
With creation of Biased TS and effective construction of
the Tangle ledger, what are the practical applications beyond
this approach? Comparing the base IOTA protocol to other
blockchains, individual transactions are processed by each
node before ledger appending. In standard execution, transactions are approved blindly with conflict resolution done
in post. There is an opportunity for distributed nodes to
intelligently analyze individual transactions before they are
approved in the ledger by comparing them to previous attack
history M in (3). With intelligent analysis, it may be possible
to detect the attack and rerun transaction selection to avoid
the adversary ledger influence. Using the robust tip selection
presented in this work, it would be difficult for adversaries
to manipulate the input to analysis algorithms, increasing
VOLUME 10, 2022

This effort presented a machine learning-based DLT ledger
construction algorithm for IoT with Biased TS. The algorithm’s performance was compared to other schemes through
simulation and improved transaction confirmation performance was found. This approach was also comparable in
energy consumption and execution time to other tested algorithms. Proof of security against manipulation for Biased
TS was shown with better regret under attacks compared to
other bandits. Future work will explore directions for more
effective detection of rare attacks.
APPENDIX
PROOFS
A. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

The definitions below are for understanding the proceeding
analysis. Several definitions are also found in [52], while
others are unique to this work.
Definition 1: (ni (t), µ̂i , µ1 , µi,C , 1i , θi (t)) Let ni (t) be the
number of times arm i was pulled. µ̂i is the empirical mean
for arm i, which is defined as
Pt−1
τ =1:i(τ )=i ri (τ )
µ̂i =
ni (t) + 1
µi is the reward mean for arm i and µ1 is the optimal arm
mean. µi,C is the mean regret created by the beta distribution
update in Algorithm 2, This value is expanded upon in the
adversarial proof but used on its own in the general proof.
1i = |µ1 − µi | is the remaining difference between the
optimal and non-optimal arms for each arm i. θi (t) is a
posterior distribution sample.
Definition 2 (xi and yi ): xi and yi are two thresholds for
θi (t) where µi < xi < yi < µ1 .
µ
µ
Definition 3 (Ei (t) and Eiθ (t)): Event Ei (t) occurs when
θ
µ̂i ≤ xi and Ei (t) occurs when θi (t) ≤ yi .
B and f B
Definition 4 (Distribution Measurements): Fn,p
n,p
denote the binomial distribution’s cdf and pmf respectively.
Beta is the cdf of the beta distribution. In addition, to relate
Fα,β
Beta (y) = 1 −
the binomial and beta distributions: Fα,β
B
Fα+β−1,y (α − 1).
Definition 5 (Ht ): Ht is the arm pull history where Ht =
{i(τ ), ri(τ ) (τ ), τ = 1, . . . , t}, i(τ ) is the arm played for time
τ , ri(τ ) (τ ) is the reward observed from time τ .
Definition 6 (Multiplicative Chernoff Bound): The multiplicative Chernoff Bound defines a bound for the tails of
a distribution. This general bound applies to any random
variable with µ = E(x). (Theorem 4.4 in [56])
−µδ 2
)
3
Definition 7 (Hi ): Hi is the maximum value that a change
in reward for arm i can take before it is filtered out by
P(X ≥ (1 + δ)µ) ≤ exp(
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Algorithm 3: H = |3σ1R +µ1R |. This value assumes that the
reward and absolute change distributions are sub-Gaussian.
Definition 8 (Bi and Attack Strategy): Let Bi note the budget an adversary has to influence the reward for non-optimal
arms. We assume the adversary chooses the optimal attack
strategy with the LSI approach [28]. For a general attack, the
Bi
. For the LSI attack, the
adversary influence is βi = ni (t−1)
adversary influence is a massive influence over the arm by
using the accrued values αi = Bt i . The adversary applies the
P
influence using the LSI strategy by βi,t = Bi − t−1
τ =1 αi,τ .

Using Def. 6 and substituting Bi = b niC(t) c for C > 1, set
Qi (T ) = 4 ClnT

B. BANDIT ALGORITHM GENERAL REGRET

Putting in the bounds for the original equation,

The approach to finding the general regret analysis upper
bound is an extension of thorough work in [52]. Where this
work deviates is changing the reward to TS with an augmented beta distribution found in Algorithm 2.
Lemma 1:
T
X
t=1

µi,C (xi Bi )2
)
3
µi,C (xi b niC(t) c)2
µi,C (xi Qi (T ))2
≤ exp(−
) ≤ exp(−
3
3
1
≤ 1.
≤
T
≤ exp(−

T
X
t=1

Lemma 2:
T
X

µ

T
X

T
X

µ

P(i(t) = i, Ei (t)) ≤

P(i(t) = i, ni (t) ≤ Qi (T ), Eiθ (t), Ei (t))

=

t=1

+

T
X

µ

P(i(t) = i, ni (t) > Qi (T ), Eiθ (t), Ei (t))

t=1

Qi (t) bounds ni (t) in the first term. For the second term,
T
X

P(i(t) = i, ni (t) >

µ
Qi (T ), Eiθ (t), Ei (t))

TX
−1

At time τk+1 for k ≥ 1, µ̂i (τn+1 ) =
to define a bound,
T
X

P(µ̂i (τk+1 ) > xi ) ≤

P(µ̂i (τk+1 ) > xi ).

µi,C
ni +1

T
X

P(

ni =0

ni =0

T
X
≤ E[
I(ni (t) > Qi (T ), µ̂i (t) ≤ xi ) · P(θi (t) > yi |Ht−1 )]

≤

T
X

≤

Letting δi =
T
X

µi,C
ni . Using Def. 6

µi,C
> xi )
ni

exp(−

ni =0

t=1

P(θi (t) > yi |Ht−1 = Ht−1 )
≤ 1 − FµBeta
(y )
i,C (xi Bi +1),µi,C (1−xi )Bi i

µ

P(Ei (τni +1 ))

ni =0

t=1

When µ̂i (t) ≤ xi , then the biased reward update in
Algorithm 2 stochastically dominates θi (t):Beta(U , (1 − U )),
If U = Beta(fi · µi,C , fi · (1 − µi,C )), the standard beta
distribution average reduces the update to µi,C . θi (t) is then
dominated by beta Beta(xi Bi µi,C + µi,C , (1 − xi )Bi µi,C ),
where Bi is the number of batches where i is selected. Given
an instance Ht−1 of Ht−1 where µ̂i (t) ≤ xi and ni (t) >
Qi (T ),

TX
−1
ni =0

t=1

µ

48
µi 12i

Proof of Lemma 2: Let τn denote the nth trial that arm i
is pulled,

t=1

=

µ

P(i(t) = i, Ei (t)) ≤

t=1

P(i(t) = i, Eiθ (t), Ei (t))

4 lnT
+ 1.
C

µ

P(i(t) = i, Eiθ (t), Ei (t)) ≤

4 lnT
µ
+1
P(i(t) = i, Eiθ (t), Ei (t)) ≤
C

Proof of Lemma 1: A function that bounds ni (t) for each
arm Qi (T ) is found by
T
X

FµBi,C (1+Bi ),yi (xi µi,C Bi + xi )

ni µi,C δi2
).
3

1i
4 ,
T

exp(−

ni =0

X
ni µi,C δi2
ni µi,C δi2
) ≤ 1+
exp(−
)
3
3
ni =1

≤ 1+

48
.
µi 12i

Thus, the bound is
T
X
ni =0

µ

P(i(t) = i, Ei (t)) ≤ 1 +

48
.
µi 12i

According to Def. 4,
1 − FµBeta
(y )
i,C (xi Bi +1),µi,C (1−xi )Bi i
= FµBi,C (1+Bi ),yi (µi,C (xi Bi + 1))
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Proof of Theorem 1: Following a similar strategy to
Theorem 1.1 and Lemmas 2.9-2.12 in [52], regret analysis
followed a martingale approach by finding individual term
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bounds for Biased TS. The expected number of arm pulls can
be found by
E[ni (T )] =

T
X

µ

P(i(t) = i, Ei (t), Eiθ (t))

t=1

+

+

T
X
t=1
T
X

µ

P(i(t) = i, Ei (t), Eiθ (t))
µ

P(i(t) = i, Ei (t)).

To represent the adversary’s influence in the second term,
we establish how the adversary influences µ̂i with the security
algorithms from µi . Since any large changes in reward are
removed by algorithm 3, βi ≤ H . The bias introduced by fi in
Algorithm 2 also limits the adversaries attacks by Cfi , where
we assume fi ≤ C2 for i 6= 1. With both of these limits,
βi =

(4)

fi Bi
fi
Hi
(
) ≤ µi ≤ Hi ≤
C ni (t)
C
21i

βi is bounded by

H σ logT
,
1i

t=1

The first term is bounded by O(1) according to Lemma 2.10
in [52]. The remaining two terms are influenced by the
beta distribution reward and their bounds are determined by
Lemmas 1 and 2. Plugging in the bounds for these terms,
48
4ln(T )
+1+
C
µi 12i
4ln(T )
48
=
+
,
C
µi 12i

E[ni (T )] ≤ O(1) + 1 +

and then finding the standard regret,
X
X 4ln(T )
48
E[R(T )] ≤
1i E[ni (T )] ≤
1i +
.
C
µi 1i
i

i

Qi (T ) = max{

Using the above bound and Def. 6,
T
X

=

µ

P(i(t) = i, Ei (t)) ≤ max{

t=1

H H σ logT
,
}+1
21i
1i

Proof of Lemma 3: We find a function that bounds ni (t)
for each arm Qi (T ), but under an adversarial setting like
Lemma C.5 in [28].
T
X

µ

P(i(t) = i, Ei (t))

t=1

=

T
X

T
X

P(µ̂i +

t=1

≤

T
X

exp(−

t=1

µ

P(i(t) = i, ni (t) ≤ Qi (T ), Ei (t))

+

Bi
µ̂i ( Cfi ( ni (t−1)
))2

3

)≤

1
≤1
T

Plugging in the appropriate terms, the bound is
µ

P(i(t) = i, Eiθ (t), Ei (t)) ≤ max{

H H σ logT
,
} + 1.
21i
1i

Proof of Theorem 2: Following the same approach as
Theorem 1, we find regret bounds for individual terms of the
expected number of arm pulls in (4). Bounds for the first two
terms are found like Theorem 1, the third term is bounded
by Lemma 3 to show adversary influence. Plugging in these
terms,
4 ln(T )
H H σ logT
E[ni (T )] ≤ O(1) + 1 +
+ 1 + max{
,
}
C
21i
1i
H H σ logT
4ln(T )
+ max{
,
.}
=
C
21i
1i
Following with standard regret, the bound is
X
X 4ln(T )
E[R(T )] ≤
1i E[ni (T )] ≤
1i
C
i

t=1
T
X

Bi
fi
(
) ≥ xi |ni (t − 1) ≥ Qi (T ))
C ni (t − 1)

t=1

The adversarial regret analysis approach also extends on
the work of [28], but an adversary has a limited budget to
influence a bandit algorithm towards non-optimal arms.
Lemma 3:
T
X

P(µ̂i + βi ≥ xi |ni (t − 1) ≥ Qi (T ))

t=1

T
X

C. ADVERSARIAL REGRET

H H σ logT
,
}.
21i
1i

i

+ max{
µ

P(i(t) = i, ni (t) > Qi (T ), Ei (t))

H
, H σ logT }
2

t=1

The first term is bounded by Qi (T ), but the adversary influences the second term.
T
X

µ

P(i(t) = i, ni (t) > Qi (T ), Ei (t))

t=1

≤

T
X
t=1

VOLUME 10, 2022

P(µ̂i + βi ≥ xi |ni (t − 1) ≥ Qi (T ))
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